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RETIREMENT PLAN DEATH BENEFITS
I. INTRODUCTION
Cinderella thought she'd found her Prince Charming-until the
"happily ever after" failed to materialize. They harbored no ill will
against each other, just realized over the years that a marriage should
be built on more than a shoe size. So, they signed away their rights to
each other's property, put the divorce decree in a safe deposit box, and
moved on with their lives. Although they remained friends, when the
tabloids broke the news of Charming's death in a tragic motorcycle
accident a few years later, Cinderella was surprised to learn she was
the named beneficiary for his retirement plan with Royalty, Inc. But
Charming's evil stepbrother was quite disgruntled about his former
sister-in-law getting the $1 million nest egg he thought should stay in
the family. He sued the retirement plan, alleging that Cinderella
waived her rights to Charming's retirement in their divorce decree,
dragging them both into years of bitter litigation.
Cinderella's story is hardly a fairy tale; it is an increasingly com-
mon predicament faced by families and courts across the country.
Hovering at the intersection of state family law and the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),I the issue of whether a
retirement plan 2 beneficiary may waive his or her interest through an
ordinary "non-qualified" divorce decree has created a definitive split
among the federal circuit courts of appeal and state supreme courts.
On one side, courts that follow the statutory approach contend that
ERISA itself addresses the issue.3 One ERISA provision provides that
retirement plan benefits cannot be "assigned or alienated," and this
includes waiver. 4 Another provision provides that retirement plan ad-
ministrators must distribute benefits according to the documents and
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
2. ERISA governs two types of retirement plans. "Defined benefit plans" may gen-
erally be thought of as old-fashioned pensions, whereby participants who meet
eligibility and vesting requirements receive a monthly payment for their lifetime.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). "Defined contribution plans" may generally be thought
of as 401(k) plans and similar arrangements whereby participants and employers
contribute to individual accounts intended for retirement, but no particular
amount is guaranteed in the end. Id. § 1002(35). Collectively, the statute refers
to both types as "employee pension benefit plans" or simply "pension plans." See
id. § 1002(2)(A) (definition). To avoid any confusion over the colloquial use of the
word "pension," and because the distinction is largely irrelevant for the issue
presented, this note uses the term "retirement plans" to refer to both types
collectively.
3. See, e.g., McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Be-
cause this case is resolved by reference to the terms of ERISA and the [pilan
documents alone, federal common law should simply have no place in our
analysis.").
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000).
20091
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
instruments governing the plan. 5 A third provision makes clear that
state law (including family law) is preempted by ERISA.6 There are
three explicit exceptions to these rules, including an exception for di-
vorce decrees that are "qualified" under specific statutory criteria.7
According to the statutory approach, the beneficiary designation on
file with the retirement plan controls who will receive the benefits of a
deceased participant, unless the requirements of one of the statute's
explicit exceptions are fulfilled.
On the other side, the "federal common law waiver" approach is
based on the premise that ERISA does not provide the answer.8 The
"anti-alienation provision" does not apply because a "waiver" by a ben-
eficiary is not an "assignment or alienation."9 The "fiduciary duty pro-
vision" does not apply because it does not explain how plan
administrators should determine who is entitled to benefits.1O And
the "preemption" provision is irrelevant because it does not preempt
federal law that is uniform and consistent across every state.1 1 Thus,
because ERISA does not answer the issue presented, courts following
this approach attempt to develop a federal common law standard for
when a waiver is effected through a non-qualified divorce decree.
In Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Invest-
ment Plan,12 the Fifth Circuit correctly adopted the statutory ap-
proach but overreached in its reasoning, thereby raising two potential
problems. This Note explains the Fifth Circuit's opinion and how the
Supreme Court has refined the Fifth Circuit's analysis to eliminate
the pitfalls. It then concludes by describing an unresolved issue in the
equitable treatment of retirement plan death benefits.
Part II gives an overview of the history of ERISA and the congres-
sional policy objectives behind it. This section then describes the split
among the circuit courts of appeal and state supreme courts, and ex-
amines ERISA's preemption of state law, the only point shared by
both approaches. Part III begins by analyzing what the Fifth Circuit
5. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D). "Documents and instruments governing the plan" include a
"written instrument" pursuant to which a plan is established and maintained, as
well as the written beneficiary designation filed by the participant. Id.
§ 1102(a)(1).
6. Id. § 1144(a).
7. Id. § 1056(d)(2)-(4).
8. See, e.g., Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 1989) ("None of
ERISA's express provisions addresses the issue presented in this case. We there-
fore must ascertain the proper federal common law principles that should
govern.").
9. See, e.g., Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d
275, 279 (7th Cir. 1990).
10. See, e.g., Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 2000).
11. See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Finch, 395 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir.
2004).
12. 497 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2007), affd, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009).
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did right in terms of the black letter law of ERISA, the policies under-
lying ERISA, and the general equities surrounding retirement plan
death benefits. This section then highlights two problems with the
Fifth Circuit's approach, explains how the Supreme Court resolved
these problems, and describes an issue raised, but not resolved, by the
Supreme Court's opinion. Part IV concludes that the result in Ken-
nedy, as defined by the Fifth Circuit and refined by the Supreme
Court, is the correct and common-sense approach to retirement plan
death benefits.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Intent and Purpose of ERISA
ERISA is "an intricate, comprehensive statute"13 regulating a wide
variety of fringe benefits offered by private employers to their employ-
ees. As a reaction to historical abuses, the statute was designed to
protect employee interests in these benefits.14 This principal objective
is declared in the statute itself, which states it "protect[s] . . . the in-
terests of participants in employee benefit plans and their benefi-
ciaries" 15 by "improving the equitable character and the soundness of
such [private retirement] plans."
16
Another principal goal of ERISA is to ease plan administration for
employers by affording them a consistent procedure for processing
claims and disbursing benefits, free from varying obligations under
state laws.17 This encourages employers to offer benefitsls by mini-
mizing their administrative and financial burdens-burdens they
13. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997).
14. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) ("ERISA is a comprehensive
statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans."); H.R. Rep. No. 93-533 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639 ("The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of
individual pension rights, but the committee has been constrained to recognize
the voluntary nature of private retirement plans.").
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
16. Id. § 1001(c).
17. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001) ("One of the princi-
pal goals of ERISA is to enable employers 'to establish a uniform administrative
scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims
and disbursement of benefits.'" (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1, 9 (1987))).
18. Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 11 ("A patchwork scheme of regulation
would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which
might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those
without such plans to refrain from adopting them."); H.R. Rep. No. 93-533 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640 ("In broad outline, the bill is designed
to: ... (5) promote a renewed expansion of private retirement plans and increase
the number of participants receiving private retirement benefits.").
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would ultimately pass on to the beneficiaries in the form of higher
costs.19
ERISA's specific provisions are intended to implement these gen-
eral policies. 20 For instance, the "plan documents rule" requires that
every plan "shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written
instrument"2 1 that must, among other things, "specify the basis on
which payments are made to and from the plan."2 2 Many of ERISA's
other provisions rest on this core principle, whereby the plan docu-
ments determine the scope and operation of each plan, generally facili-
tating certainty, which in turn allows for efficient and inexpensive
administration. Most important for the issue presented, ERISA relies
on the plan documents rule to impose a fiduciary duty on plan admin-
istrators to discharge their duties "in accordance with the documents
and instruments governing the plan."23 Once benefits are thus de-
fined and protected from the whims of the plan administrator, ERISA
protects those benefits from third parties and the participant's own
whims by prohibiting nearly any "assignment" or "alienation" of plan
benefits.24
But bright-line rules inevitably cause inequity in some cases. For
this reason, the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA) was enacted to
afford greater protection for participants' spouses, 2 5 and to put to rest
"any concern for the ability of individuals to freely and voluntarily re-
linquish certain rights in their former spouses' ERISA plan benefits
upon divorce." 26 The REA amended ERISA in two ways. First, it re-
quired every defined benefit plan 2 7 to provide an annuity to any sur-
viving spouse after a participant's death.28 This spousal interest
cannot be waived or reassigned without the spouse's written
consent. 29
19. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149-50 ("Requiring ERISA administrators to master the
relevant laws of 50 States and to contend with litigation would undermine the
congressional goal of'minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden[s]' on
plan administrators-burdens ultimately borne by the beneficiaries." (quoting
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990))).
20. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
22. Id. § 1102(b)(4).
23. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
24. Id. § 1056(d)(1) ("Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under
the plan may not be assigned or alienated.").
25. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 843. See generally id. at 842-47 (discussing the REA in more
detail).
26. McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2005).
27. See supra note 2.
28. If the participant retires and begins receiving pension benefits before their death,
this is called a "qualified joint and survivor annuity." 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (2000).
If the participant dies before retiring, a smaller annuity called a "qualified prere-
tirement survivor annuity" is required. Id. § 1055(a)(2).
29. Id. § 1055(c).
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Second, and most important for the issue presented, REA created
the concept of qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs).30 A
QDRO allows a state court to sidestep ERISA's anti-alienation and
preemption provisions31 and use retirement plan funds in awarding
alimony or child support or when dividing marital property.3 2 To
qualify as a QDRO, a domestic relations order issued under state law
must meet certain requirements. 33 Most notably, a QDRO must
clearly specify how payments are to be made from the retirement plan
and to whom.34 Retirement plan administrators must develop proce-
dures for determining whether domestic relations orders they receive
are QDROs and must notify the affected parties of their
determination. 3 5
Despite the strides made by REA, some equitable outliers persist,
and Kennedy illustrates one of the most troublesome. In a Kennedy-
type dispute, a retirement plan participant designates his or her
spouse as the beneficiary to receive survivor benefits upon the partici-
pant's death. The couple divorces at some point thereafter, but no
QDRO is issued, and the participant never changes the beneficiary
designation. Upon the participant's death, sometimes years later,
benefits are therefore paid to the ex-spouse as the named beneficiary
on file with the plan administrator. This result is challenged by the
participant's heir apparent, 3 6 who believes they should be entitled to
the benefit by virtue of some language in the non-qualified divorce de-
cree purporting to divest each spouse of any interest in the other's
retirement savings or property in general. Thus, the issue in a Ken-
nedy-type dispute is whether a non-qualified divorce decree consti-
tutes a waiver of a beneficiary's rights to retirement plan death
benefits.
The challengers would likely have a clear-cut case under state fam-
ily law. Under state law, divorce decree language purporting to waive
one spouse's interest in the other's retirement plan could constitute a
valid waiver. 37 In addition, some state statutes provide that a divorce
decree automatically revokes any beneficiary designation in favor of
30. See id. § 1056(d)(3).
31. QDROs are explicitly excepted from these provisions. Id. §§ 1056(d)(3)(A),
1144(b)(7).
32. Id. § 1056(d)(3).
33. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(C)-(E).
34. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(C)(i)-(iv).
35. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)-(ii).
36. Typically, the challenger is the participant's child or subsequent spouse.
37. See generally 1 OLDFATHER, ET. AL., VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL
PROPERTY § 4.10[5] (2004) (explaining that some jurisdictions require a waiver to




the former spouse unless the designation is renewed after the
divorce. 38
However, all of these state laws are preempted by ERISA's "delib-
erately expansive"3 9 express preemption provision, which states that
the statute "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."4o The Su-
preme Court has held that a state law41 relates to an ERISA plan "if it
has a connection with or reference to such a plan."42 To determine
whether a state law has such a connection, the Court looks to the
objectives of the statute and the effect of the state law on ERISA
plans.4 3 Thus, "[tihe express preemption provisions of ERISA are de-
signed 'to establish pension plan regulations as exclusively a federal
concern."' 4 4
In a Kennedy-type dispute, ERISA's preemption of state law is the
only point on which all courts ostensibly agree. 45 Beyond this, the fed-
eral circuit courts of appeal and state supreme courts fall into two
camps. Generally, the split is based on the answer to one question:
whether ERISA addresses the dilemma posed by Kennedy-like waiv-
ers in non-qualified divorce decrees and other contracts.4 6 Courts that
follow the "federal common law waiver approach" assert that ERISA is
silent on this issue; courts that follow the statutory approach conclude
38. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.07.010(2)(a)
(1994); TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 9.302(a) (2006).
39. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). QDROs are explicitly excepted from the preemption
provision. Id. § 1144(b)(7).
41. For preemption purposes, "state law" is defined as including "all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations or other State action having the effect of law, of any State." Id.
§ 1144(c)(1).
42. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
43. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc.,
519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997). See also Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S.
141, 147 (2001); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995).
44. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)). See also Pilot Life, 481
U.S. at 45-46.
45. Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Without ex-
ception, courts have held that ERISA preempts the application of state law under
the circumstances of this case."). However, agreement on the preemption issue is
somewhat undermined by the use of state law to craft federal common law. See
infra notes 78-84, 156-171, and accompanying text.
46. This is precisely the issue pinpointed by the Fifth Circuit in Kennedy v. Plan
Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he
relevant inquiry is whether, in the light of the anti-alienation provision, the fed-
eral law governing the resolution of this action may be reasonably drawn from
the text of ERISA itself, or must instead be developed as a matter of federal com-
mon law."), affd, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009).
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that several provisions of ERISA combine to dictate a result that
leaves no room for federal common law.
B. The Statutory Approach
Circuits and state supreme courts that follow the statutory ap-
proach assert that ERISA does not allow a named beneficiary to waive
rights to plan benefits through a divorce decree or other contract.
These courts generally point to two provisions of ERISA, and the poli-
cies underlying them, as a mandate that benefits must be paid to the
named beneficiary, regardless of any attempt to waive that right to
payment. 4 7
First, these courts invoke the plan documents rule48 and the fiduci-
ary duties provision 4 9 to require ERISA plans to operate and pay ben-
efits according to written plan documents and rules.5 0 These courts
consider this mandate as requiring plan administrators to only follow
the plan documents. Therefore, any effort to look beyond them is a
violation of explicit statutory commands.5 1 These courts bolster this
interpretation with the policies underlying ERISA, explaining that
their holdings afford simple, uniform administration and allow parties
to avoid the expense of litigation because they can be certain of their
rights at all times.
5 2
Second, at least one court also asserts that ERISA's anti-alienation
provision 53 prohibits waivers. Although "waiver" is not expressly pro-
hibited by the language of this provision, it could fit within the Trea-
47. Unless, of course, waiver is authorized by the plan terms, and a beneficiary ful-
fills the requirements thus imposed by the plan. See infra note 146 and accompa-
nying text.
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(1), (b)(4) (2000). See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying
text.
49. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
50. See McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 245-48 (3d Cir. 2005); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126, 130 (6th Cir. 1996); McMillan v. Parrott,
913 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1990).
51. McGowan, 423 F.3d at 246 ("[A]ny requirement imposed on [pilan administrators
to look beyond [plan] documents would go against the specific command of [the
fiduciary duties provision].").
52. Id. at 246 ("Strict adherence to [the fiduciary duties provision] ensures that all
interested parties, including participants, beneficiaries, and plan administrators,
can identify their rights and duties with certainty, a primary objective of ERISA.
This in turn limits costly disputes over the effect of outside documents on the
distribution of plan benefits."); McMillan, 913 F.2d at 312 (asserting that the
court's holding "fulfills the intent of Congress that ERISA plans be uniform in
their interpretation and simple in their application" and "allows the parties to be
certain of their rights and obligations ... thus avoiding expensive litigation" as
occurred in that case).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000). See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
2009]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
sury Department regulation defining the type of prohibited
"assignment or alienation."5 4 As the Third Circuit recently explained:
ERISA's silence with respect to the right to waive benefits supports the con-
clusion that such a right does not exist .... [T]he QDRO provision, which
recognizes the right to designate alternate payees under certain circum-
stances, gives rise to the strong implication that the designation of alternate
payees under other circumstances is not consistent with the statutory
scheme.
5 5
There are two main examples of the statutory approach. 56 In Mc-
Millan v. Parrott, the Sixth Circuit confronted a dispute over retire-
ment plan benefits that pitted the participant-decedent's ex-wife
against his widow, to whom he had been married for less than 24
hours, and his children from yet another marriage. 5 7 The Sixth Cir-
cuit held that the former wife, as the named beneficiary, was entitled
to the proceeds at issue.58 In addition to discussing the preemption of
state law59 and the fiduciary duty provision,60 the court emphasized
that four years passed between the participant's divorce and his
death, during which he could have changed the beneficiary designa-
tion at any time.6 1 "A participant is master of his own ERISA
plan .... Simply put, it was [the participant's] designation which con-
trols, not [the former wife's] intent" in waiving the benefits.62
In McGowan v. NJR Service Corporation, the Third Circuit consid-
ered a dispute between a participant and the retirement plan adminis-
trator that refused to recognize his ex-wife's purported waiver
contained in a property settlement agreement. 6 3 The Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to the
plan administrator. 64 In doing so, it pointed to the fiduciary duty6 5
54. McGowan, 423 F.3d at 249 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (1997)). See
infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 249-50.
56. In addition, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Pressley, 82 F.3d 126, 129 (6th Cir.
1996), applies the rule set by McMillan and some district court cases have also
applied the statutory approach. See, e.g., Zienowicz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 205 F.
Supp. 2d 339 (D.N.J. 2002). Courts often cite Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7
F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993), as another example of the statutory approach. Krishna
aligns with the statutory approach philosophically, but the precise issue there
was preemption, not waiver.
57. McMillan, 913 F.2d at 310.
58. Id. at 312.
59. Id. at 311. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
60. Id. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
61. Id. at 311-12.
62. Id. at 312.
63. McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 243 (3d Cir. 2005). This unusual
posture was caused because the participant divorced after he retired and the plan
rules did not permit any changes to beneficiary designations after benefit pay-
ments began. Id.
64. Id. at 250.
65. Id. at 245-48. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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and anti-alienation provisions 66 and emphasized that, although the
statute dictated a "somewhat strange result," Congress had carefully
crafted the detailed requirements contained in ERISA, and "[a]s such,
our holding 'is a decision already made by legislation."' 67
C. The Federal Common Law Waiver Approach
Courts that follow the federal common law waiver approach assert
that ERISA is silent regarding whether a named beneficiary may
waive rights to plan benefits through a divorce decree.68 In so hold-
ing, these courts usually refute the construction of the ERISA provi-
sions discussed above. However, some opinions simply ignore one of
these provisions, probably because that argument is not raised by the
parties. 69 The specific reasoning used by each court thus varies, but
some broad disagreements with the statutory approach can be
observed.
First, these courts find that the fiduciary duty provision 70 "does
not either expressly or implicitly purport to establish any methodology
for determining the beneficiary of an ERISA plan or for resolving com-
peting claims to insurance proceeds."7 1 Instead, it simply outlines a
plan administrator's duties.7 2 Thus, these courts conclude that it is "a
very thin reed" to support a finding that ERISA answers the question
of how to determine the beneficiary of a retirement plan. 7 3
Second, these courts find the anti-alienation provision 7 4 inapplica-
ble because it "focus [es] on the assignment or alienation of benefits by
a participant, not the waiver of a right to payment of benefits made by
a designated beneficiary."75 This idea encompasses two independent
66. Id. at 248-50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 248 (quoting Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v.
Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
68. See, e.g., Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 1989) ("None of
ERISA's express provisions addresses the issue presented in this case.").
69. See, e.g., Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, 270 Neb. 1, 3-7, 701
N.W.2d 320, 324-25 (2005) (largely ignoring ERISA's anti-alienation provision);
Lyman Lumber Co., 877 F.2d 692 (failing to mention or discuss ERISA's anti-
alienation or fiduciary duty provisions).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000). See supra notes 23, 48-52, and accompanying
text.
71. Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 2000).
72. Strong, 270 Neb. at 11, 701 N.W.2d at 329.
73. Manning, 212 F.3d at 872.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000). See supra notes 24, 53-55, and accompanying text.
75. Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 279
(7th Cir. 1990). Some courts also point out, correctly, that the anti-alienation
provision is not applicable to employee welfare benefit plans. See infra notes
100-103, and accompanying text.
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premises: (1) that waiver is not an assignment or alienation,76 and (2)
that the anti-alienation provision does not apply to beneficiaries. 7 7
Once they find that waiver is allowed under ERISA, these courts
are left with a federal statute that offers no answers but bars them
from supplementing their query with state law.78 Thus, they must
develop a body of "federal" common law to fill in the gaps in the stat-
ute.79 These courts generally "have no trouble" borrowing state law to
craft a federal common law standard for effective waivers.8 0 The Fifth
Circuit adopted a Texas law "creating a presumption of waiver absent
redesignation following divorce"S1 but modified the rule to require
that "any waiver of ERISA benefits be explicit, voluntary, and made in
good faith."82 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits focus not just on ex-
plicitness, but on whether the purported waiver contains "terms spe-
cifically divesting the spouse's rights as a beneficiary under the policy
or plan."8 3 In response, the Fifth Circuit rejected this "magic words"
approach in favor of a "reasonable person" standard, finding waiver
"if, upon reading the language in the divorce decree, a reasonable per-
son would have understood that she was waiving her beneficiary
interest."84
Ultimately, courts that follow the federal common law waiver ap-
proach are driven by the equities evoked in the particular facts of each
case and by the desire to avoid giving retirement plan proceeds to an
76. See, e.g., id. This premise is less popular; courts following the federal common
law waiver approach usually avoid this issue altogether and focus on the second
premise.
77. See, e.g., id. at 279-80; Estate ofAltobelli v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81
(4th Cir. 1996); Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tex. 2003); see also McMil-
lan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 312 n.1 (6th Cir. 1990) (dismissing the issue as iden-
tified by Fox Valley "because we herein hold that the interest of [the named
beneficiary] is controlled by the plan documents as they provided at the time of
[the participant's] death").
78. As discussed above, even federal common law courts agree that ERISA's express
preemption provision applies to the issue presented. See supra note 45.
79. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
80. Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 2000).
81. Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1326 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.632 (West 1987).
82. Id. at 1327. See Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Finch, 395 F.3d 238, 240
(5th Cir. 2004); Manning, 212 F.3d at 874; Clift ex rel. Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268,
271 (5th Cir. 2000). But see Keen, 121 S.W.3d at 732 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing against a "voluntary" requirement because it produces an illogical result that
"ERISA precludes stripping one spouse of any interest in the other's pension plan
in a contested divorce but not in an agreed divorce").
83. Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 1989). See also Fox Val-
ley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund, 897 F.2d 275, 281 (7th Cir. 1990)
(stating the need for specificity in the waiver provision).
84. Manning, 210 F.3d at 871-72.
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ex-spouse.8 5 Many courts do not expressly declare this motivation,
but it is quite evident in their reasoning and is often included among
the criticisms set forth by proponents of the statutory approach.8 6
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Fifth Circuit's Opinion in Kennedy
With this background in mind, this Note turns to the case that
serves as the window into the issue presented. The facts as set forth
by the Fifth Circuit in Kennedy are as follows. William Kennedy mar-
ried Liv Kennedy in 1971.87 In 1974, he designated her as the sole
beneficiary for his savings and investment plan (SIP), a retirement
plan8 8 provided by his employer, DuPont, and governed by ERISA.89
The Kennedys divorced twenty years later, in 1994.90 Pursuant to
the non-qualified divorce decree, Liv Kennedy agreed to be divested of
"all right, title, interest, and claim in and to ... the proceeds there-
from, and any other rights related to any... retirement plan, pension
plan, or like benefit program existing by reason of [decedent's] employ-
ment."9 1 In 1997, a QDRO was issued to provide benefit-disburse-
ment instructions for some of William Kennedy's non-SIP employee-
benefit plans.92 However, no QDRO was ever approved or submitted
with regard to the SIP.93 William Kennedy also never executed any
documents replacing or removing Liv Kennedy as the SIP
beneficiary. 9 4
William Kennedy died in 2001. After his death, Kari Kennedy, the
couple's daughter and executor of William Kennedy's estate, de-
manded that the SIP administrator pay the retirement plan funds to
the estate. 9 5 She cited a Texas statute that invalidated a spouse's des-
ignation as a retirement plan beneficiary upon divorce.96 The admin-
85. See, e.g., Silber v. Silber, 786 N.E.2d 1263, 1269 (N.Y. 2003) ("Strict application of
ERISA requirements, while likely serving the ends of uniformity, may not serve
the ends of fairness .... ").
86. See, e.g., Estate of Altobelli v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir.
1996) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) ("Here, the equities of the majority's disposi-
tion seem tempting, but ERISA's provisions compel a contrary outcome.").
87. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 427 (5th Cir.
2007), affd, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009).
88. Under the technical terms of ERISA the SIP is an "employee pension benefit
plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (2000). See supra note 2.
89. Kennedy, 497 F.3d at 427.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 427-28.




96. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.302 (2006)).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:204
istrator refused this demand, and paid the $400,000 SIP balance to
Liv Kennedy, who also refused the estate's request to relinquish the
funds.97
The estate then sued the SIP administrator, asserting an ERISA
claim and a state-law breach-of-contract claim.98 The estate argued
that Liv Kennedy had waived her rights to the SIP benefits through
the non-qualified divorce decree, which invalidated the SIP benefici-
ary designation, and therefore the administrator had incorrectly dis-
tributed the benefits.9 9
In reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
estate, the Fifth Circuit delivered a relatively short opinion endorsing
the statutory approach. First, the court pointed out that the anti-
alienation provision applies only to retirement plans.10 0 By its terms,
it does not apply to employer-sponsored "welfare plans," which include
health, life, and disability insurance and other non-retirement fringe
benefits.lOl The court thus distinguished its previous opinions es-
pousing the federal common law waiver approachlO2 because those
cases involved welfare plans, and the anti-alienation provision was
not at issue.1 0 3
The court then brushed over the preemption analysis in its fram-
ing of the issue: "Because ERISA preempts state law for the issue at
97. Id. Liv Kennedy moved to Norway and spent the money before she died in 2007.
Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 34, Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont
Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009) (No. 07-636) (noting that Liv Kennedy
"spent $402,000.00 on a Norwegian smorgasbord of excess"); Petitioner's Brief on
the Merits at 8, Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct.
865 (2009) (No. 07-636) (noting that Liv Kennedy died in Norway on July 7,
2007).
98. Kennedy, 497 F.3d at 427. The SIP filed a third-party claim against Liv Kennedy,
which was settled. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 429. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (2000) (defining "pension plan" and "employee
pension benefit plan"); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000) ("Each pension plan shall
provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.");
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988)
("[Tihere is no ignoring the fact that, when Congress was adopting ERISA, it had
before it a provision to bar the alienation or garnishment of ERISA plan benefits,
and chose to impose that limitation only with respect to ERISA pension benefit
plans, and not ERISA welfare plan benefits.") (emphasis in original).
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000) (defining "employee benefit welfare plan" and
"welfare plan" as those providing "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits,
or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment,
or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care cen-
ters, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services").
102. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit distinguished four cases: Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
America v. Finch, 395 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2004); Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866
(5th Cir. 2000); Clift ex rel. Cliff v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2000); and Bran-
don v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321 (5th Cir. 1994).
103. Kennedy, 497 F.3d at 429.
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hand, the relevant inquiry is whether, in the light of the anti-aliena-
tion provision, 'the federal law governing the resolution of [this action]
may be reasonably drawn from the text of ERISA itself, or must be
developed as a matter of federal common law."' 10 4
The court rejected the estate's argument that "waiver" differs from
"assignment" or "alienation,"1 0 5 citing a Treasury Department regula-
tion that was endorsed in McGowan and Boggs.10 6 The regulation de-
fines "assignment or alienation" as "[a]ny direct or indirect
arrangement ... whereby a party acquires from a participant or bene-
ficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to, all or
any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become, payable
to the participant or beneficiary."10 7 The court concluded that Liv
Kennedy's waiver contained in the non-qualified divorce decree was
an "indirect arrangement" that gave the estate "an interest enforcea-
ble against the plan," and therefore the waiver was barred by the anti-
alienation provision.1 0
The court also rejected the estate's argument that two Fifth Circuit
cases endorsed the federal common law waiver approach.1 0 9 The Ken-
nedy court did not overrule those cases, but distinguished them be-
cause neither involved a waiver contained in a non-qualified divorce
decree, and so neither implicated the QDRO provisions.11o
The court then reasoned that "[in the marital-dissolution context,
the QDRO provisions supply the sole exception to the anti-alienation
provision."111 For support, the court cited McGowanll 2 and Boggs,
wherein the Supreme Court noted how carefully Congress drafted the
QDRO exception, and stressed that it is "not subject to judicial expan-
104. Id. (quoting Manning, 212 F.3d at 870) (internal citations omitted).
105. Id. at 430. The estate cited two cases for this assertion: Estate ofAltobelli v. Int'l
Bus. Mach. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1996); Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr.
Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 1990).
106. McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2005); Boggs v.
Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 851 (1997).
107. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (2008).
108. Kennedy, 497 F.3d at 430.
109. Rhoades v. Casey, 196 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying, in the retirement plan
context, an "exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision for a knowing and vol-
untary waiver of retirement benefits that is executed to reach a settlement");
Stobnicki v. Textron, Inc., 868 F.2d 1460 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that "a contro-
versy between good-faith adverse claimants to [retirement] plan benefits is sub-
ject to settlement like any other, and that an assignment made pursuant to a
bona fide settlement of such a controversy is not invalidated by the anti-aliena-
tion provision").
110. Kennedy, 497 F.3d at 430.
111. Id. at 430-31 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 431 ("[T]he QDRO provision . .. 'gives rise to the strong implication that'
the designation of alternate payees under other circumstances (i.e. through waiv-
ers) is 'not consistent with the statutory scheme.'") (quoting McGowan v. NJR
Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005)).
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sion."1 13 Finally, the Fifth Circuit held, "When, as here, ERISA pro-
vides a specific mechanism-the QDRO-for addressing the
elimination of a spouse's interest in plan benefits, but that mechanism
is not invoked, there is no basis to formulate a federal-common-law
rule."114
B. What the Fifth Circuit Did Right
The Fifth Circuit was correct to shun the federal common law
waiver approach. Although the equitable aspects of the federal com-
mon law waiver approach are alluring, the statutory approach is bet-
ter supported by the black letter law of ERISA, the public policies
behind ERISA, and the general equities involved in retirement plan
death benefits.
1. The Black Letter Law of ERISA
Three ERISA provisions strongly suggest that the federal common
law waiver approach is inappropriate: the plan documents rule, the
fiduciary duties provision, and the preemption provision. The plan
documents rule requires ERISA plans to establish their rules and poli-
cies in a written plan document.115 Based on that rule, the fiduciary
duties provision requires plan administrators to discharge their duties
in compliance with those governing documents. 11 6 The preemption
provision establishes retirement plans as an exclusively federal
sphere of regulationl17 by superseding all state laws that "relate to"
such plans. 1 1s Analyzed in conjunction, and compounded with ER-
ISA's silence regarding waiver, 11 9 these three provisions suggest that
plan administrators should look only to the plan rules and the benefi-
ciary designation on file, and nothing else, in determining who should
receive retirement plan death benefits like those at issue in
Kennedy.12o
113. Id. (quoting Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 (1997)).
114. Id.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000). See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
116. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
117. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1987); Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Pressley, 82
F.3d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1996).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). QDROs, based on state family law, are explicitly excepted
from the preemption provision. Id. § 1144(b)(7). See supra notes 31, 39-44 and
accompanying text.
119. McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2005) ("ERISA's si-
lence with respect to the right to waive benefits supports the conclusion that such
a right does not exist.").
120. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 847 (1997) (discussing the "strong implication"
that community property claims are "not consistent with the statutory scheme" in
light of the surviving spouse annuity and QDRO provisions).
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The Supreme Court used this analysis in Egelhoff to hold a Wash-
ington statute preempted when it revoked previously executed benefi-
ciary designations in favor of a spouse upon divorce from that
spouse. 12 1 The Court reasoned that the statute "binds ERISA plan
administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining benefici-
ary status," thereby "implicat[ing] an area of core ERISA concern."1 22
"In particular, it runs counter to ERISA's commands that.., the fidu-
ciary shall administer the plan 'in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the plan,' making payments to a 'beneficiary'
who is 'designated by a participant, or by the terms of [the] plan."' 123
The federal common law waiver approach also "binds ERISA plan
administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining benefici-
ary status"124 because it requires plan administrators to look beyond
plan documents to determine the correct beneficiary.125 Therefore,
the federal common law waiver approach violates the plan documents
rule and fiduciary duties provision. In contrast, the statutory ap-
proach gives proper deference to the "clear statutory command"126 of
the fiduciary duties provision because it defers to the documents on
file with the retirement plan, rather than honoring outside agree-
ments that would require plan administrators to look beyond, and per-
haps even violate, the plan documents.12 7
An even more troubling aspect of the federal common law waiver
approach is the courts' use of state law to craft federal common law,
the very state law held preempted just paragraphs before.128 This
blatantly and inappropriately undermines ERISA's express preemp-
tion provision, producing the same result as if state law was never
121. Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 144 (2001). WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 11.07.010(2)(a) (West 1998) reads: "If a marriage is dissolved or invali-
dated, a provision made prior to that event that relates to the payment or trans-
fer at death of the decedent's interest in a nonprobate asset in favor of or granting
an interest or power to the decedent's former spouse is revoked. A provision af-
fected by this section must be interpreted, and the nonprobate asset affected
passes, as if the former spouse failed to survive the decedent, having died at the
time of entry of the decree of dissolution or declaration of invalidity." This section
has since been amended to include state registered domestic partnerships. See
Act of April 21, 2007, ch. 156, § 13, 2007 Wash. Legis. Serv. (West).
122. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147.
123. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(8), 1104(a)(1)(D)) (internal citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 141-42.
126. McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1990).
127. McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 245-46 ("[T]he statute dictates that
it is the documents on file with the Plan, and not outside private agreements
between beneficiaries and participants, that determines the rights of the
parties.").
128. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
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preempted.12 9 Even if it were appropriate to craft federal common
law to resolve the issue presented, it is exceedingly difficult to discern
how "reincarnating130 state law into the federal common law could be
consistent with the policies of ERISA that mandate preemption of that
same state law.131 Far from affording uniform administration, the
federal common law waiver approach leaves plan administrators to
sort out varying standards for "waiver" based on differing state
laws. 132
Courts have the authority, in appropriate circumstances, to create
federal common law under ERISA133 but not to revise the text of the
statute. 134 ERISA's plan documents rule, fiduciary duty, and preemp-
tion provisions clearly manifest congressional intent to enact "an intri-
cate, comprehensive statute"' 35 completely covering the payment of
benefits, "an area of core ERISA concern." 13 6 The federal common law
waiver approach disregards this "considered congressional policy
choice"137 and undermines the black letter law. As the venerable
Judge Easterbrook eloquently explained:
129. Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721, 730 (Tex. 2003) (Hecht, J., dissenting) ("[Tihis
Court simply circumvents preemption by allowing state law to be reincarnated as
federal common law. The result is the same, practically speaking, as if state law
were not preempted at all.").
130. Id.
131. Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Even when it is
appropriate for a federal court to create federal common law, it may use state
common law as the basis of the federal common law only if the state law is consis-
tent with the policies underlying the federal statute in question . . . .") (quoting
Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir. 1986)); Keen, 121 S.W.3d
at 726-27 (endorsing the federal common law waiver approach but "disagree [ing]
with the [lower court's] formulation of federal law as a mere conduit for applying
individual state statutes" because "[sluch an approach presents the same obsta-
cles to national uniformity that ERISA preemption was designed to prevent, re-
quiring plan administrators to determine complex choice-of-law questions, and
then to interpret and apply varying state laws").
132. Strong v. Omaha Constr. Industry Pension Plan, 270 Neb. 1, 15-18, 701 N.W.2d
320, 332-33 (2005) (Connolly, J., dissenting) ("A myriad of tests has been devel-
oped for determining whether language in a divorce decree was sufficient to act
as a waiver."). See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
133. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989); Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) ("It is also intended that a body of Federal
substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving
rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.") (quoting 120
Cong. Rec. 29,933 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).
134. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 259 (1993). See also Boggs v. Boggs, 520
U.S. 833, 844 (1997) ("States are not free to change ERISA's structure and bal-
ance."); Krishna, 7 F.3d at 14 ("[F]ederal courts may not use state common law to
re-write a federal statute.") (quoting Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 960).
135. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 841.
136. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001).
137. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990).
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ERISA is full of unyielding rules, designed to simplify administration. Rules
have their flaws; loopholes and overbreadth, both producing unpalatable out-
comes in the event of unanticipated circumstances, are among them. But
whether to have rules (flaws and all) or more flexible standards (with high
costs of administration and erratic application) is a decision already made by
legislation. Congress and pension plans elected to use rules rather than stan-
dards; patterns of avoidance mean that we transmute the approach Congress
chose into the one it rejected.
1 3 8
Federal common law waiver courts attempt to refute the fiduciary
duties portion of this analysis in several ways, all of which are un-
availing. First, these courts assert that plan administrators may look
outside the plan documents in determining who should receive benefit
payments, pointing to the QDRO provisions as an example of such au-
thorization. 13 9 But this reasoning is misleading because following
QDRO instructions is paying benefits according to plan documents for
one of two reasons. In one sense, QDROs become plan documents
when a plan administrator receives them and determines that they
are "qualified."'14 0 This is supported by the fact that QDROs are not
effective until lodged with a plan.141 Thus, "honoring 'qualified' or-
ders on file reinforces rather than undermines the inference that [re-
tirement] plans may not look beyond written instructions."142 In
another sense, even if QDROs are not "plan documents" themselves,
paying benefits according to QDRO instructions is complying with
plan documents, because those documents must, under the terms of
ERISA, allow administrators to follow QDRO instructions.1
4 3
138. Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275,
283-84 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
139. See, e.g., Estate of Altobelli v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir.
1996) ("[11n some situations, [Congress] deems the intent of the parties suffi-
ciently important to override the policy of simplified administration."); Keen v.
Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721, 724 (Tex. 2003) ("[Other provisions of ERISA require
plan administrators to look beyond beneficiary designations in plan documents to
determine entitlement to plan benefits.").
140. Silber v. Silber, 786 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 ("[A] QDRO may serve as a plan document
.... "). See also Brief for Respondents at 58, Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont
Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009) (No. 07-636) ("In essence, a QDRO submit-
ted to and approved by the plan becomes-like the completed beneficiary-desig-
nation form itself-a plan document.").
141. Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("[This is]
something 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(i), (ii)(II) implies in establishing procedures
for plans to evaluate orders once they have been lodged."). See also Mills v. Mills,
790 F.Supp. 172 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (refusing to enforce a QDRO that was not first
presented to the plan).
142. Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 283 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (2006) ("Each pension plan shall provide for the pay-
ment of benefits in accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified
domestic relations order."). See also Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. &
Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 876 (2009) ("[A] plan administrator who enforces a
QDRO must be said to enforce plan documents, not ignore them."); Supplemental
Brief for Respondents at 8 n.3, Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv.
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Second, at least one court asserts that the fiduciary duty provision
does not "establish any methodology for determining the beneficiary of
an ERISA plan."14 4 This, too, is simply false. The fiduciary duty pro-
vision supports the most straightforward "methodology" of all: follow
the rules set by the plan and the participant's intent as properly mani-
fested by his or her beneficiary designation.145 Not only is this "meth-
odology" simple and easy to understand, it also has the virtue of being
flexible. If a plan administrator wants to recognize the supposed
"waiver" in a non-qualified divorce decree, it need only include that
rule in its plan documents.146 Conversely, if a plan administrator
chooses not to recognize these supposed waivers, an action which is
not expressly required by ERISA, courts should not force them to do
SO.
2. The Public Policies and Legislative Intent Underlying ERISA
In addition to betraying the "unyielding rules" enacted by Con-
gress, 14 7 the federal common law waiver approach also undermines
the public policies underlying ERISA and the legislative intent behind
the statute. The statutory approach espoused by the Fifth Circuit in
Kennedy preserves the integrity of these policies.
The statutory approach supports the principal policy of promoting
and protecting participants' interests. This is accomplished by giving
participants total control over their retirement plan proceeds. 14 8
When a participant is unavailable to declare his or her wishes, as is
Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009) (No. 07-636) ("But regardless of whether a QDRO is a
plan document, payment of benefits in accordance with a QDRO is mandated by
the plan documents and thus complies with the 'plan documents' requirement.").
144. Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 2000). See supra notes 70-73 and
accompanying text.
145. Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Tex. 2003) (Hecht, J., dissenting) ("ERISA
provides a general rule that is 'simple and easy to apply' for participants, benefi-
ciaries, and plan administrators alike: look to the beneficiary designation, except
in very specific cases.").
146. See Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Neither Party at 14, Kennedy v.
Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009) (No. 07-636) ("The
plan also could have resolved this matter and protected itself if it had more de-
tailed plan provisions."); see also Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 875 n.10 (leaving open
'any questions about a waiver's effect in circumstances in which it is consistent
with plan documents"); George A. Norwood, Who is Entitled to Receive a Deceased
Participant's ERISA Retirement Plan Benefits- An Ex-Spouse or Current
Spouse? The Federal Circuits Have an Irreconcilable Conflict, 33 GoNZ. L. REV.
61, 101 (1998) (suggesting ERISA retirement plan rules be amended in this way
to circumvent the issue presented altogether).
147. Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 283 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
148. See McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1990) ("A participant is
master of his own ERISA plan.").
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usually the case with retirement plan death benefits,149 the courts
should look to the source that most clearly identifies those wishes: the
beneficiary designation they filed with the plan, usually on a form pro-
vided by the plan for that purpose. By filing a beneficiary designation,
participants should be able to reasonably expect that it will be fol-
lowed. The federal common law approach substitutes a court's judg-
ment for the participant's wishes or does not even consider them at
all.150
This idea is well illustrated in Kennedy. If William Kennedy so
wished, he could have changed his beneficiary designation or obtained
a QDRO to ensure his ex-wife, Liv Kennedy, would not receive his re-
tirement plan death benefit. Although he had seven years to take one
of these steps, and he knew how to accomplish both,151 he did neither.
Because no one can confirm his true intent after his death, the best
approach "to promote the interests of employees"15 2 is to err toward
his most clearly manifested intent-the beneficiary designation on file
with the plan.
The statutory approach also promotes the interest of beneficiaries
in an important way by "ensur[ing] that all interested parties, includ-
ing participants, beneficiaries, and plan administrators, can identify
their rights and duties with certainty" at all times. 153 Because "[a]
participant is master of his own ERISA plan"' 5 4 and can cut off a ben-
eficiary at any time by simply changing the designation,155 secure
149. McGowan v. NJR Service Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005), is an anomaly on
this point. See supra note 63.
150. McMillan, 913 F.2d at 312 (disapproving of the federal common law waiver ap-
proach's focus on the ex-spouse's intent in executing a purported waiver, rather
than the participant's designation).
151. During the seven years between his divorce and death, William Kennedy changed
a separate beneficiary designation to name his daughter, Kari Kennedy, and
sought a QDRO authorizing payment of other ERISA-governed benefits to Liv
Kennedy. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3-4, Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for Du-
Pont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009) (No. 07-636).
152. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
153. McGowan, 423 F.3d at 246 (quoting Estate of Altobelli v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp,
77 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1996) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting)). See also Altobelli,
77 F.3d at 82 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) ("Reliance on the face of written plan
documents also furthers another of ERISA's central goals, that of enabling bene-
ficiaries and employees to learn their rights and obligations at any time.") (quot-
ing Curtis-Wright Corp. v. Shoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 74 (1995)); McMillan, 913
F.2d at 312 ("Such a holding also allows the parties to be certain of their rights
and obligations."); Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v.
Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 284 (7th Cir. 1990) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (noting that the
fiduciary duties provision "embodies a strong federal policy that all parties-par-
ticipant, trustee, and beneficiary-be able to ascertain their rights and liabilities
with certainty").
154. McMillan, 913 F.2d at 312.
155. The statute protects only current spouses as beneficiaries, through REA's provi-
sions for qualified joint and survivor annuities and qualified preretirement survi-
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knowledge about the participant's expressed intent, as expressed by
his or her designation, is the most a beneficiary can receive before the
participant dies and the interest becomes collectable.
Yet under the federal common law waiver approach, beneficiaries
cannot clearly identify their rights because the vague "magic words"
standard156 is fact-intensive and unpredictable.157 Far from promot-
ing beneficiaries' interest in certainty, courts following the federal
common law waiver approach apply different standards and some-
times come to significantly different conclusions. For example, the
very similar property settlement agreement terms in Lyman and Fox
Valley produced opposite outcomes.158 In Lyman, the Eighth Circuit
found a term stating that the decedent "shall have as his own, free of
any interest of [the wife], his interest in the profit-sharing plan of his
employer" was insufficient to waive the beneficiary designation of the
wife.159 But in Fox Valley, the Seventh Circuit held that a term stat-
ing the parties "waive any interest or claim in and to any retirement,
pension, profit-sharing and/or annuity plans resulting from the em-
ployment of the other party" was a valid waiver.160
Outcomes can conflict even within a circuit. The Eighth Circuit
came to opposite conclusions, despite similar waiver provisions,161 in
Mohamed v. Kerr162 and National Automobile Dealers & Associates
Retirement Trust v. Arbeitman.16 3 In Mohamed, the wife "could not
get away fast enough" after her husband was diagnosed with
Alzheimer's Disease, and admitted that the illness prompted her deci-
sion to initiate their divorce.16 4 The court found these facts "espe-
cially compelling for [its] conclusion" that the wife had waived her
interest under the non-qualified divorce decree.16 5 In Arbeitman, de-
cided just fifteen months later, the property settlement agreement
language was very similar to that in Mohamed, but the Eighth Circuit
vor annuities. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. This protection
does not apply to participants' former spouses (e.g. Liv Kennedy) or children (e.g.
Kari Kennedy).
156. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
157. See Altobelli, 77 F.3d at 83 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) ("Forcing plan trustees
[to determine whether waiver is effected] will only complicate plan administra-
tion and will leave all parties unsure of their rights and obligations.").
158. Id. at 81 (comparing these two outcomes).
159. Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 1989).
160. Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275,
277, 282 (7th Cir. 1990).
161. See Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 12-13, Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for
DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009) (No. 07-636) (comparing these two
outcomes).
162. 53 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1995).
163. 89 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 1996).
164. Mohamed, 53 F.3d at 916.
165. Id.
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distinguished its previous holding on factual grounds, including the
couple's "amicable relationship" after the divorce.
16 6
With such varying standards and outcomes, the federal common
law waiver approach also undermines ERISA's principal policy of uni-
form, efficient administration.16 7 These courts claim to afford uni-
formity through supposedly consistent federal common law, 168 but
when courts borrow from various states' law to develop federal com-
mon law, there can be no consistency. 16 9 Ultimately, just as
"[ulniformity is impossible . . . if plans are subject to different legal
obligations in different States," 170 uniformity is impossible if plans
are subject to different legal obligations in different federal circuits. 
17 1
The statutory approach supports this policy of uniform, efficient
administration. 172 When the time is right to distribute benefits, plan
administrators, regardless of their location, need only consult the plan
documents and the beneficiary designation in their files. As Judge
Easterbrook explained in his Fox Valley dissent, "Rules requiring pay-
ment to the named beneficiary yield simple administration, avoid
double liability, and ensure that beneficiaries get what's coming to
them without the folderol essential under less-certain rules."173
Finally, the statutory approach reduces litigation and therefore
minimizes administrative and financial burdens placed on plan ad-
ministrators and passed along to beneficiaries. A simple rule mandat-
ing payment according to plan documents gives parties a simple, quick
166. Arbeitman, 89 F.2d at 501.
167. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Finch, 395 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir.
2004) ("[Alpplying federal common law to determine if an ERISA plan's benefici-
ary waived her rights can be seen as promoting, rather than undermining, na-
tional uniformity.").
169. Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721, 732 (Tex. 2003) (Hecht, J., dissenting) ("While
application of some federal common law does not theoretically threaten uniform
plan administration in the same way fifty states' laws would, as a practical mat-
ter uniformity is impaired by the differences in federal common law in the cir-
cuits due to the way in which it is derived-by reference to states' laws.").
170. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001).
171. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 876
(2009) ("What goes for inconsistent state law goes for a federal common law of
waiver that might obscure a plan administrator's duty to act in accordance with
the documents and instruments.") (internal quotation omitted).
172. McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Our holding is
not only required by the terms of [the fiduciary duty provision], but it is also
necessary to promote one of the principal goals underlying ERISA-ensuring that
'plans be uniform in their interpretation and simple in their application.'") (quot-
ing McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1990)).
173. Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 283
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). See also McMillan, 913 F.2d at 312 (quoting Fox
Valley for this proposition).
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answer and allows them to avoid expensive litigation.I74 By contrast,
the federal common law approach actually generates litigation with
its various, unpredictable "magic words" standards.175
3. The General Equities Involved in Retirement Plan Death
Benefits
As discussed above,17 6 equitable solutions to the issue presented
are inappropriate because "the effectuation of certain broad social pol-
icies sometimes takes precedence over the desire to do equity between
particular parties."17 7 However, assuming arguendo that it could be
appropriate to consider the equities of the issue presented, the statu-
tory approach is also more equitable than the federal common law
waiver approach, in addition to being simple, clear, and easy to apply.
Despite good intentions, 78 the federal common law waiver ap-
proach is not actually equitable. A recent Seventh Circuit case is just
one example of the injustices that can result.17 9 In Melton ex rel. Mel-
ton v. Melton, a dispute arose between a deceased participant's 14-
year-old daughter and his ex-wife (her former stepmother). Under the
terms of her parents' divorce, the daughter should have been the bene-
ficiary of her father's life insurance policies as long as he owed child
support.18 0 However, her former stepmother was the named benefici-
ary when her father died.181 The daughter argued that her step-
mother had waived her interest in the decedent's life insurance
174. McGowan, 423 F.3d at 246 ("This in turn limits costly disputes over the effect of
outside documents on the distribution of plan benefits." (quoting Estate of Al-
tobelli v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1996) (Wilkinson, C.J.,
dissenting))); McMillan, 913 F.2d at 312 ("If the designation on file controls, ad-
ministrators and courts need look no further than the plan documents to deter-
mine the beneficiary, thus avoiding expensive litigation .... ").
175. Altobelli, 77 F.3d at 83 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) ("[U]ncertainties over the
interpretation of external documents will produce conflicts among parties assert-
ing rights to plan benefits, miring plan assets in expensive litigation.").
176. See supra notes 67, 133-138 and accompanying text.
177. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990). See
also Altobelli, 77 F.3d at 84 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) ("What seem like small
equitable steps in a particular case may lead to large administrative headaches
in the aggregate.").
178. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
179. Melton ex rel. Melton v. Melton, 324 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2003).
180. Id. at 943. This is a common divorce decree provision, intended to ensure a cer-
tain amount of money will be available for children's support even in the event
that the payor parent dies before the child support obligation ends. See generally
1 OLDFATHER, ET. AL., VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
§ 41.05[21 (2004) ("[IUn many jurisdictions a support order may require a parent
to maintain life insurance for the benefit of the children.")
181. Melton, 324 F.3d at 944.
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proceeds in their non-qualified divorce decree.' 8 2 The court held that
the stepmother had not waived her interest because the decree con-
tained "a blanket revocation" and did not "expressly identify [the dece-
dent's] ERISA-regulated employee group term life insurance."
18 3
Thus, a minor child with a legitimate, court-ordered need for her fa-
ther's support was denied equity under the federal common law
waiver approach.
By contrast, the statutory approach is equitable because it honors
participants' intentions as manifested in their beneficiary designa-
tions and their reasonable expectations in believing this formal plan
document will be honored instead of "extraneous" documents' 8 4 like
divorce decrees, property settlements, or other contracts. The equity
of this approach is grounded in the fact that people understand the
purpose and importance of beneficiary designations. The importance
of keeping your beneficiary designations current is not a secret re-
served for the nation's ERISA experts;' 8 5 it is a common topic in the
mainstream media.' 8 6 Also, participants have plan administrators at
their disposal to help navigate plan provisions to effect their wishes.
And in the divorce context, spouses are often represented by an attor-
ney familiar with the collateral effects of property settlement agree-
ments. Most of these attorneys advise their clients to review and
change beneficiary designations as a matter of course after a marriage
is dissolved. With such widespread knowledge and accessible re-
sources, it is not unfair to hold participants accountable for their bene-
ficiary designations.
C. What the Fifth Circuit Did Wrong
Although the Fifth Circuit was correct to choose the statutory ap-
proach over the federal common law waiver approach, its analysis is
troubling on two points. First, the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that
QDRO provisions are the only exception to the anti-alienation provi-
sion available in the divorce context' 8 7 may leave divorcing spouses
182. Id. The daughter also argued that ERISA did not preempt Illinois state family
law, and therefore her parents' divorce decree should control; the Seventh Circuit
rejected this argument. Id.
183. Id. at 946.
184. Estate of Altobelli v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 84 (4th Cir. 1996) (Wil-
kinson, C.J., dissenting).
185. BriefAmicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Neither Party at 12, Kennedy v. Plan
Adm'r for DuPont Say. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009) (No. 07-636) ("The ne-
cessity of reviewing and changing beneficiary designations after a divorce is not a
secret known only by those who toil in the minefields of ERISA.").
186. Id. at 13 (citing articles about the issue in various legal publications as well as
mainstream publications such as the Los Angeles Times, Kiplinger, USA Today,
and the Wall Street Journal).
187. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir.
2007), affd, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009).
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without any method to waive claims upon their ex-spouse's retirement
plans. 18 8 This is because it is not clear that a QDRO may effect such a
bare waiver with a corresponding reassignment. ERISA defines a
QDRO as a domestic relations order that "creates or recognizes the
existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate
payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with
respect to a participant under a plan."18 9 Thus, the statute itself says
that a QDRO must involve an "alternate payee," defined as "any
spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant."190
A bare waiver is by definition a transaction not involving any alter-
nate payee, and therefore the statute suggests that QDROs cannot be
used to effect waivers.19 1 Because QDROs are "the sole exception"
available to divorcing spouses under the Fifth Circuit's analysis, the
anti-alienation rule would bar all attempts to effect a waiver in Ken-
nedy and similar cases.
Second, the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the anti-alienation rule
as proscribing any and all "indirect arrangements" by which a benefi-
ciary could be separated from retirement plan benefits may leave ben-
eficiaries without any method to disclaim benefits, that is, to refuse
them so that they pass to the next beneficiary in line. Generally, a
beneficiary may execute a disclaimer because the beneficiary wants to
avoid burdens associated with the property, adverse tax consequences
caused by the property, or the possibility of turning the property over
to creditors.19 2 Regardless of the reason, courts have long protected a
beneficiary's ability to disclaim, reasoning that freedom of choice re-
quires the ability to avoid unwanted burdens.193 This has developed
into an axiom: "The law is certainly not so absurd as to force a man to
take an estate against his will."194 This idea has been translated into
the realm of ERISA, too.195 Although the Internal Revenue Code does
not explicitly authorize disclaimers of retirement plan benefits, the In-
188. The Fifth Circuit did recognize the importance of allowing waiver to occur in
some fashion when it distinguished its cases involving settlement of disputes
outside the divorce context. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
189. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2006).
190. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(K). If a participant's estate could qualify as an "alternate payee,"
a QDRO could perhaps effectively serve as a waiver.
191. But see 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(g)(4)(ii) (2008) ("A QDRO may provide that the
current spouse waives all future rights to [qualified preretirement survivor annu-
ity] or [qualified joint and survivor annuity].").
192. John H. Martin, Perspectives on Federal Disclaimer Legislation, 46 U. Cm. L.
REV. 316, 319-20 (1979).
193. Id. at 316, 318 (citing a long history of American cases supporting "the venerable
doctrine that an intended recipient of a gift may reject it").
194. Id. at 316 (quoting Towson v. Tickell, (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 575, 576-77 (K.B.)).
195. See Lawrence Newman & Albert Kalter, The Need for Disclaimer Legislation-
An Analysis of the Background and Current Law, 28 TAx LAw. 571, 587 (1974)
(recognizing a trend toward allowing beneficiaries to disclaim an interest in a
spendthrift trust, which is the common law precursor to ERISA's anti-alienation
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ternal Revenue Service has taken the position that the anti-alienation
rule is not violated if the disclaimer complies with both I.R.C. § 2518
and applicable state law. 19 6 Thus, retirement plans typically allow
disclaimers if they are qualified under the Internal Revenue Code.197
This widespread and judicially supported practice might be jeopard-
ized under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of prohibited assignments
and alienations if their reasoning is extended to exclude disclaimers
as "indirect arrangements" by which someone gains an "interest en-
forceable against the plan."19s
D. The Supreme Court Opinion in Kennedy
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue
presented-what it called a split "over a divorced spouse's ability to
waive pension plan benefits through a divorce decree not amounting
to a QDRO."199 After an unusual request for supplemental briefs from
the parties, 20 0 Justice David Souter delivered a unanimous opinion in
Kennedy on January 26, 2009.201 The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit
but used only the fiduciary duties provision and preemption as
grounds. In essence, the Court split the issue in two: whether Liv
Kennedy waived her rights to her ex-husband's SIP benefits in their
non-qualified divorce decree, and whether the plan administrator was
required to acknowledge that waiver. Although at first glance this ap-
proach may seem to introduce unnecessary complication, the dissected
holding was necessary to alleviate the potentially problematic implica-
tions of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning for disclaimers and waivers. 20 2
In addressing the first part of the issue, the Court rejected the
Fifth Circuit's treatment of the non-qualified divorce decree waiver as
a violation of the anti-alienation rule because it was an "indirect ar-
rangement" through which William Kennedy's estate received "an in-
rule: "No reason is readily apparent why the inability of a beneficiary to dispose
of an interest once it is accepted should prevent him from refusing to accept it.").
196. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,858 (Sept. 9, 1991), 1991 WL 776304 (concluding that
a qualified disclaimer is not a prohibited "assignment or alienation" because the
rules governing them are consistent with the congressional purposes underlying
ERISA).
197. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 869
(2009) (noting that the DuPont SIP permits beneficiaries to submit qualified dis-
claimers to the plan).
198. See Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 497 F.3d 426, 430 (5th
Cir. 2007), affd, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009).
199. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 870.
200. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 485 (2008)
(mem.).
201. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009).
202. See supra section III.C.
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terest enforceable against the plan."20 3 The opinion supported this
holding in several ways. First, it pointed out the "odd usage" in con-
sidering an estate to be the "transferee of its own decedent's property,"
and in considering an interest "acquired" when the waiver occurs
years before any estate or beneficiary exists to acquire it.204 Second,
the opinion expressed concern that neither spousal waivers of annui-
ties authorized by REA2o5 nor qualified disclaimers authorized by the
Internal Revenue Code2o6 would be allowed under the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of the anti-alienation rule, although they are "plainly
not barred."207 Third, the Court drew a parallel between the anti-
alienation rule and spendthrift trust provisions, the corollary in the
law of trusts that "serves as ERISA's backdrop."20 It concluded,
"[Tihe general principle that a designated spendthrift can disclaim his
trust interest magnifies the improbability that a statute written with
an eye on the old law would effectively force a beneficiary to take an
interest willy-nilly."20 9 Fourth and finally, the Court deferred to the
Treasury's interpretation of its own regulation. As the Treasury ex-
plained in its amicus brief, "[N]o party 'acquires from' a beneficiary a
'right or interest enforceable against the plan' pursuant to a benefici-
ary's waiver of rights where the beneficiary does not attempt to direct
her interest in pension benefits to another person."2 10
The Court also rejected the Fifth Circuit's position that the QDRO
provisions are "the sole exception to the anti-alienation provision."211
This "negative implication" would be "powerful evidence" if a QDRO
could be used to merely waive one spouse's interest in benefits. 2 12
However, the Supreme Court explained, "a beneficiary seeking only to
relinquish her right to benefits cannot do this by a QDRO .... There
is no QDRO for a simple waiver; there must be some succeeding desig-
nation of an alternate payee."213 For these two reasons, the Court de-
cided that "the better view" is that Liv Kennedy waived her interest in
203. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 871. See Kennedy, 497 F.3d at 430 (citing 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (2006)).
204. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 871.
205. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
206. I.R.C. § 2518 (2006).
207. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 871.
208. Id. at 871-72 (citing Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101 (2007)).
209. Id. at 872.
210. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 18, Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865
(2009) (No. 07-636)).
211. Id. at 873.
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I), part of the statute that spells out the
requirements for a QDRO). But see 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(g)(4)(ii) (2008) ("A
QDRO may provide that the current spouse waives all future rights to [qualified
preretirement survivor annuity] or [qualified joint and survivor annuity].").
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William Kennedy's SIP benefits through their non-qualified divorce
decree, and that waiver was not barred by the anti-alienation rule.214
The Court then turned to the second part of its dissected issue,
"whether the plan administrator was required to honor Liv's waiver
with the consequence of distributing the SIP balance to the Estate."2 15
The analysis here was largely a straightforward application of the
statutory approach. The Court spelled out ERISA's requirements that
all plans be established pursuant to a written instrument 21 6 specify-
ing the basis on Which payments are made2 17 and that plan adminis-
trators fulfill their duties "in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the plan."21 8 The Court then invoked the pol-
icy underlying these requirements: establishing a uniform administra-
tive scheme to aid claims processing and benefits payment 21 9 rather
than forcing administrators "to examine a multitude of external docu-
ments"220 and either initiate or defend litigation centered on those
documents. 221 This led the Court to conclude, "The point is that by
giving a plan participant a clear set of instructions for making his own
instructions clear, ERISA forecloses any justification for enquiries
into nice expressions of intent, in favor of the virtues of adhering to an
uncomplicated rule."222 The Court then acknowledged that plan ad-
ministrators look outside plan documents to evaluate and enforce
QDROs, but doing so is "enforc[ing] plan documents, not ignor[ing]
them,"2 23 and is "a far cry" from discerning whether a federal common
law waiver has been effected. 22 4
The Court bolstered this conclusion with two of its recent preemp-
tion cases-Boggs2 25 and Egelhoff.226 Based on these cases, the Court
reasoned, "What goes for inconsistent state law goes for a federal com-
mon law of waiver that might obscure a plan administrator's duty to
act in accordance with the documents and instruments."22 7 The im-
plications for Kennedy were then clear:
Under the terms of the SIP Liv was William's designated beneficiary. The
plan provided an easy way for William to change the designation, but for
214. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 873.
215. Id. at 875.
216. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)).
217. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(4)).
218. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D)).
219. Id. (quoting Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)).
220. Id. at 876 (quoting Estate of Altobelli v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 82-83
(4th Cir. 1996) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting)).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 875.
223. Id. at 876.
224. Id.
225. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
226. Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
227. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 877 (internal quotation omitted).
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whatever reason he did not. The plan provided a way to disclaim an interest
in the SIP account, but Liv did not purport to follow it. The plan administra-
tor therefore did exactly what [the fiduciary duty provision] required: "the
documents control, and those name [the ex-wife]."
2 2 8
E. A Lingering Question
One hole remains in the equitable fabric of the statutory approach.
The Kennedy Court held that the Liv Kennedys of the world can waive
an interest in their ex-spouses' retirement plans through a non-quali-
fled divorce decree. However, such waivers are effectively meaning-
less unless they can be enforced, and Kennedy firmly establishes that
waivers cannot be enforced by suing the plan administrator for direct
payment of benefits. What is missing from Kennedy is whether en-
forcement may be had in some other way.2 29
The most likely' enforcement method is a state-law constructive
trust claim asserted by someone like Kari Kennedy directly against
the ex-spouse who purportedly waived their interest in the retirement
plan funds but accepted the funds anyway. 230 As long as such a claim
is asserted after the plan administrator pays the funds to the ex-
spouse, the weight of lower court authority says that ERISA does not
prevent it.231 The key is asserting the claim after the retirement plan
228. Id. at 877 (citing McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1990)).
229. The Court expressly acknowledged that it left this issue undecided. Id. at 875
n.10 ("Nor do we express any view as to whether the Estate could have brought
an action in state or federal court against Liv to obtain the benefits after they
were distributed.").
230. See generally Sarabeth A. Rayho, Note, Divorcees Turn About in Their Graves as
Ex-Spouses Cash In: Codified Constructive Trusts Ensure an Equitable Result Re-
garding ERISA-Governed Employee Benefit Plans, 106 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378
(2007) (arguing that "state statutory constructive trusts can resurrect the revoca-
tion-by-divorce doctrine as applied to ERISA-governed employee benefit plans in
order to reach an equitable result consistent with the law's treatment of other
will substitutes as well as wills themselves"). It should perhaps be noted that
any attempt to treat a property settlement agreement under general contract law
and sue for breach of that contract would be converted into a constructive trust
claim under the "familiar rule of equity that a contract to convey a specific object
even before it is acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets a
title to the thing." Sereboffv. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 367 (2006)
(citing Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117, 121 (1914)).
231. Kickham Hanley P.C. v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan, 558 F.3d 204, 209-16
(2d Cir. 2009); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967, 974 (6th Cir. 2006)
("This circuit, along with a majority of the other circuits, has held that once bene-
fit payments have been disbursed to a beneficiary, creditors may encumber the
proceeds."); Hoult v. Hoult, 373 F.3d 47, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Once benefits are
distributed to the beneficiary, a creditor's rights are enforceable against the bene-
ficiary, not against the plan itself .... "); United States v. All Funds Distributed
To, or o/b/o Weiss, 345 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Only once the proceeds of the
pension plan have been released to the beneficiary's hands, can creditors and
others pursue claims againt the funds and the funds' owner(s)."); United States v.
Jackson, 229 F.3d 1223, 1225 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court erred
232
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funds are paid, so the plan is not involved in the litigation and the
policy favoring uniform and efficient plan administration is no longer
implicated. Thus, this method allows courts to determine who should
be entitled to the funds under all of the facts and circumstances-in-
cluding a purported waiver-without needing to address who is enti-
tled to benefits under the terms of the plan. Where appropriate, 23 2
this framework allows courts to produce an equitable result without
undermining ERISA's express provisions or policies. Moreover, this
method makes common sense. After all, the real dispute in a case like
Kennedy is between the ex-spouse and the estate; the plan administra-
tor is simply caught in the middle.233
by ordering restitution be paid out of undistributed ERISA retirement plan pro-
ceeds, but noting the "irony" therein: "If the district court had not ordered Jack-
son to leave his funds in the ERISA plan, and if Jackson had voluntarily cashed
out his plan, the distributed funds would have been available for immediate pay-
ment of restitution."), overruled in part by United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041,
1057-58 (9th Cir. 2007); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Howell,
227 F.3d 672, 678-79 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[O]nce the benefits of an ERISA employee
welfare benefit plan have been distributed according to the plan documents, ER-
ISA does not preempt the imposition of a constructive trust on those benefits.");
Robbins v. DeBuono, 218 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (1997), the same regulation cited by the Fifth Circuit in
Kennedy as support for its ultimately rejected "implied assignment" rationale and
agreeing with the majority view that ERISA "protects benefits only while they
are held by the plan administrator and not after they reach the hands of the
beneficiary"), overruled on other grounds by Wojchowski v. Daines, 498 F.3d 99,
101 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Our opinion in the instant case does not affect the ERISA
holding in Robbins."); Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir.
1998) ("ERISA does not preempt [state] law permitting the imposition of a con-
structive trust on insurance proceeds after their distribution to the designated
beneficiary."); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass'n, Local No.9, 10 F.3d
700, 716 (10th Cir. 1993) ("There is a distinction in the law between benefits in
the plan and benefits paid and received by the participant under the plan.... We
therefore hold, under the facts of this case, that ERISA provides no protection to
funds paid to, and received by, the plan participant."), on remand from 493 U.S.
365 (1990), affd en banc, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Mulligan, 210 F.Supp.2d 894, 898-900 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (reasoning that ERISA
preempted the state law that would revoke ex-spouse's designation as life insur-
ance beneficiary, but denying summary judgment on an interpleader claim to
consider the decedent's children's claim for a constructive trust); NCNB Financial
Svcs., Inc. v. Shumate, 829 F.Supp. 178, 180 (W.D.Va 1993) ("[O]nce the line of
actual receipt is crossed, as it undoubtedly is in this case, ERISA no longer pro-
tects funds despite their origination in an ERISA-qualified pension plan."); Par-
dee v. Personal Representative for Estate of Pardee, 112 P.3d 308, 314-16 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2004) ("The prevailing view is that ERISA does not protect pension
funds after the beneficiary receives the funds.").
232. An example of when it might be inappropriate to force an ex-spouse to forfeit
waived benefits would be where the decedent had subsequently renewed the ben-
eficiary designation in favor of the ex-spouse. See supra text accompanying note
38.
233. Brief for Respondents at 1, Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan,
129 S. Ct. 865 (2009) (No. 07-636) ("Although petitioner brought this suit against
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit was correct to adopt the statutory approach in
Kennedy because ERISA's plan documents rule, fiduciary duties rule,
and preemption provisions, the policies underlying ERISA, and the
general equities surrounding retirement plan death benefits make
clear that the federal common law waiver approach was poorly rea-
soned. However, the Fifth Circuit's analysis overreached the mark by
broadly rejecting the federal common law waiver approach. This over-
reach placed beneficiaries' ability to disclaim benefits at risk and
threatened to leave divorcing spouses with no method to effectively
waive claims upon each other's retirement plans.
The Supreme Court rectified this oversight by holding that Liv
Kennedy waived her interest in her ex-husband's SIP benefits in their
non-qualified divorce decree, but that the plan administrator was
duty-bound to pay her the account balance as the named beneficiary
on file with the plan. This distinction laid to rest the convoluted and
confused federal common law waiver approach, but left one more gap
in the equitable scheme. To close this gap, courts should allow estates
and alternate beneficiaries to enforce waivers like Liv Kennedy's by
suing the ex-spouses directly under a state law constructive trust
theory.
Of course, the most practical implication of Kennedy is so common-
sense as to be almost overlooked: divorcing spouses, and all retirement
plan participants, generally should regularly ensure their beneficiary
designations are up-to-date. This will avoid the issue presented en-
tirely and allow a happily-ever-after ending.
the plan under ERISA, the underlying dispute is between the estate and Liv; the
plan recognizes its statutory obligation to pay the pension benefits to the rightful
beneficiary.").
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